Katja Grace's
Meteuphoric
is one of the more consistently interesting blogs to pop up in the
past few years, and I find it all the more so because I haven't quite
been able to get a handle on its terrain. She uses it to observe and
reason aloud about topics that involve philosophy, economics,
psychology, rationality, cognitive science and the like, but you
wouldn't really say the blog is necessarily
about those things.
There's a variety — as of this writing, its front page covers an
intellectual span from paying drug addicts not to pop out kids, the
connection between bad teaching and certification and the social
signaling of Mother's Day — but it also feels as if there's a definite
focus. Hence my inclination to shoot her an e-mail and have a
conversation about what, exactly, Meteuphoric is. Here's the result.
* * *
Colin Marshall: Having come across your
blog via a link from Marginal Revolution's Tyler Cowen, I
was delighted to find you'd already written two archives of posts on
compelling subjects — compelling to my mind, at least. I'm still
wondering how I might characterize the entire project, and rest assured
I've plenty of questions to ask about that, but let me start with this:
do you really think about the ins-and-outs of organ sales as often as I
imagine you do? Having read through all your posts, I can't help but
feel it's been something of a leitmotif. Does that subject happen to
stand at the overlap of a few of your interests, or am I imagining
things?
Katja Grace: Yes, organ
markets are at the intersection of a few interesting things —
psychology, ethics, institution design, arguing into the night. They
are also one of the small number of things that make me slightly cross.
I'll tell you why they are interesting for psychology and ethics.
I like things that allow a glimpse at how tenuous the
connection is between reality and how we see it, and I think organ
markets are one. Many of us feel instantly certain that organ markets
should be prevented, and that it's for the sake of potential traders.
Yet there seems no easy reason that organ markets should be worse than
other exchanges. Some people argue for hours on this one, without any
clear argument and a changing collection of unclear ones. Once someone
read me a poem to try to get across the incommunicable wrongness I was
missing, in vain. It's interesting to ask what about the situation is
really so repellent, and why we are so sure our aversion is altruistic.
This
leads to the general topic of the difference between being ethical and
feeling ethical. Much of what our moral intuitions tell us is in
contradiction with what we think are worthy principles. We like to
think life is worth a lot for instance, yet in practice life more than a
few miles away is worth nothing unless we are personally acquainted
with the potentially deceased. Even if we calculate that organ markets
would benefit users, many of us feel bad about them. What do you do
when feeling virtuous comes into conflict with doing good? Most people
go with their feelings.
This is what makes me slightly cross;
we have reasons to believe some of our mental faculties should have
evolved to be truthful, such as aspects of vision, but there is no
reason our moral feelings should have evolved to make us benefit others
consistently, so it is dishonest of us to pretend that following them
somehow will. That people put their own comfort ahead of others
receiving life saving organs while pretending it is for the good of
traders irks me. As a friend pointed out, I am hypocritically motivated
by disgust at others’ hypocritical motivation by disgust.
Colin
Marshall: Ah, the old "refutation by poem." I presume that the
person who tried that on you didn't know you all that well?
Even
beyond the muddy thinking one finds about organ markets, the gap
between attitudes as reflected in peoples' speech and attitudes as
reflected in their actions seems, in my reading, to have become a larger
theme in your writing with time. There's an interest there in your
earliest posts, sure, but there's more of one now. How did you come to
be intrigued specifically by the points where "feeling" a certain way
and "being" a certain way diverge? Do you see this brand of hypocrisy
everywhere, or is it confined only to certain sectors of life?
Katja
Grace: There's more than one way to know someone well; for
instance you can be very familiar with a person's peculiarities without
the slightest clue what thoughts could prompt them.
I
became interested when I was thirteen and I heard that ABBA — my
favorite band at the time — had refused to go on a reunion tour
despite a billion dollars' offer. My mother said this was awful of
them, as they could fix a small third-world country for a few weeks'
singing, saving many lives. This point didn't seem that specific to a
billion dollars, though. Any smaller proportion of lives for a smaller
proportion of money had to be as good a deal. So, not wanting to murder
anyone, I determined not to misuse a cent while such problems lasted
and I could help.
It seemed odd that I hadn't thought of this
before, but I didn't dwell on it. I figured other people would be
interested to hear this great plan, as they valued human life so much.
However whenever I explained to anyone they thought of some dubious
sounding reason they couldn't be sure they could do anything or that
their usual ethics shouldn't apply there. I didn't want to believe that
everyone around me was evil, so I cheatingly decided they were
probably delusional instead, and took an interest in what was going on.
How
broadly does hypocrisy apply? Not sure, but here are some hints. It
looks bad to overtly seek things like sex, status, and admiration. Even
to admit that such things motivate you to otherwise admirable
activities will likely lose you sex, status and admiration. It also
appears that we want and benefit evolutionarily from these sorts of
things a lot. So if seeking them overtly is condemnable, it would seem
strange if we didn't seek them under the guise of other goals if we
could. This could be at an evolutionary level or unconsciously, though,
rather than through our own minds consciously planning any hypocrisy.
We may just find that our genuine desire to help others is somehow
sapped when nobody will see.
I suspect most hypocrisy is
somewhat like this; we act on what seems right to us and don't notice
this is inconsistent and altered by situational factors we wouldn't
consciously support. Verifying that your behavior isn't unconsciously
bent toward hypocrisy isn't generally considered necessary for
answering the question "Am I a hypocrite?", so any related knowledge
can happily remain just close enough to consciousness to remind one not
to look there.
Colin Marshall: Here we see a bit of
overlap with the ground
Robin Hanson covers in his
rationality-themed blog
Overcoming
Bias. Reading your posts, it's easy to see that you're a fan of
his, and reading the comments below your posts, it's easy to see that
he's a fan of yours — his face, at least in icon form, has become a
fixture around Meteuphoric.
But he's not the only influence
you cite in your writing. Others named in posts include
Thomas Schelling,
La Rochefoucauld,
Paul Gowder and
Steven Pinker. Who else's work do you
look to as catalysts for your own thought? Who or what, aside from the
ABBA-driven curiosity you just described provided the entrée — or
"pushed the gateway drug," if you prefer — into reading the sort of
thinkers that you do?
Katja
Grace: I like interesting ideas and don't mind who writes them, so I
look for topics more than authors. I often can't even remember who
writes things I like — it took a lot of liking Overcoming Bias before I
noticed who wrote it at all, and more to realize Robin and Eliezer
weren't both women's names.
I like most topics that can be
analyzed with neat principles. Vagueness, unorganizable detail and
narratives bother me, so I'm yet to find a workable way to know about
history. I try to read famous things; I figure they are likely better
and others can discuss them readily. I don't read the news much; I find
newspapers hard to get through, and if anything happens that I'm in a
position to influence, someone will probably tell me.
I like
thinking more than reading (a potentially dangerous characteristic) so I
try to read things that will be fun or productive to think about, or
that I already think something about and want to hear the arguments
against. I'm not sure about a particular entree —
Sophie's World
by
Jostein Gaarder was influential. It contained an amazing lot
of interesting ideas for someone who was used to reading fiction about
pre-teen girls.
Colin Marshall: I can't resist
probing that bit about the potential dangers of thinking more than you
read. What
do you think are the problems lurking around corners
for those who spend more time internally processing, modifying, testing
and reflecting upon ideas than receiving intellectual input? Where do
you think you currently fall on the spectrum that runs from those who
only read to those who only think? Can you conceive of an ideal place
to reside on that spectrum, or is it more of a matter of trial and
error?
Katja Grace: The extreme of thinking with no
intellectual input gets you as far as a thoughtful caveman. The other
extreme is zero improvement on what exists around you. I'm not sure
what the optimal compromise is, and it would depend on the topic, but I
suspect I am biased in favor of thinking. It's more effort to think
correct interesting things than interesting things, and hard for
uninvolved listeners to tell the difference, or for that matter for you
to. So if you pride yourself at all on having interesting ideas,
there's an incentive to think too much.
This probably isn't a
major effect in society; more people seem toward the reading end of
your spectrum and like a lot of detailed knowledge, keeping up with
everything that happens without trying to add much to it. These
"biased" positions are not necessarily errors, but merely the results
of people's goals not being to produce good insights efficiently. I'm
not sure how productive a world with some people focussed on thinking
and some on reading is compared to one where most people take the best
personal compromise. I mostly feel like I don't read enough personally
because reading seems so slow compared to thinking, but I suppose if I
really cared I would have learned to speed read by now.
Colin
Marshall: Which brings me to the range of topics you discuss on
Meteuphoric. You've written an
about page which says the blog "is about ideas
that apply to lots of things for long enough to be interesting." A
wide-open field, as you'd no doubt agree. As a reader, it seems to me
that you write about whatever holds enough personal interest for you to
compose a post about. This is super-reductive, yes, but is it actually
incorrect?
And whether or not that's a perfectly suitable
description, yours does strike me as an unusually successful effort —
in terms of visible reader engagements, high-profile links to it
elsewhere,
etc. — given the broadness of its subject matter. It
seems to me that 90 percent the blogosphere's population writes about
whatever happens to interest them — and their words go unread. What, in
your handling of a somewhat similar blogging principle, do you think
attracts a readership of your readership's quality? Is it perhaps to do
with the aforementioned focus on the
ideas that underpin the
things on whose surfaces another blogger might linger?
Katja
Grace: It's true my claimed theme is a guess at what bounds my
interests more than a constraint. There are more criteria though: I try
to only post on things where I have a single specific insight that I
haven't heard before. That cuts out rants, winding streams of thought
and other broad overviews, as well as most reposting of others' ideas. I
actually have about three times as many unpublished drafts as posts,
mostly because there are issues I've thought a bit about, but don't
have a neat single insight I'm confident in to contribute.
I'm
not sure why my blog is successful. I don't try to appeal much beyond
what personal aesthetics dictates, apart from some extra effort toward
clear explanation. A difference from many other blogs is that I try to
write dispassionately when talking about people, who are usually
generic, and rarely talk about myself or my personal preferences or
prejudices. I'm not sure these things help popularity — if the rest of
the media is anything to go by, people like emotion, taking sides, and
knowing about specific people more than ideas.
Colin
Marshall: And finally, I must ask: how does the thinking and
writing you do on Meteuphoric reflect back on your everyday life? An
unsettling percentage of the people I know who spend sizable chunks of
their time pondering and communicating, on the net or otherwise, about
issues of rationality, intelligence, human behavior and how things
really are versus how they seem don't seem to incorporate their own
findings into their operative worldview. How much do you notice that
the questions you raise and conclusions at which you arrive on the blog
feed back into and shape how you live, and how much is all this stuff
compartmentalized off by itself?
Katja Grace: I have
to say I'm a hypocrite here to be consistent; either I apply what I
write to my life, and thus interpret my behaviour as often
hypocritical, or I'm hypocritical for not applying it. It's probably a
mix. It's easier to tell yourself that you are delusional about your
real motives than it is for that thought to seriously compete with the
feeling that you aren't.

Most interesting thoughts
are wrong, and normal behaviour presumably embodies a lot of previous
thought and experimentation, so trying to implement everything you
think of in your life can go badly. Which is a good reason to work out
why people do or believe things before you write them off. I spent a
lot of my childhood rescuing snails from sidewalks because I couldn't
think of any good argument for their experience being less vivid than
mine, and before that my imaginary friends used to "Pascal's mug" me
because I couldn't prove they didn't exist, and they could threaten me
with anything, being imaginary. In those cases going with popular
opinion might have been better.
These days my most unusual
practical application of thinking is to try to save most of my money to
give to the most worthy cause I can find. It used to be all of it — my
mother thought this so silly she responded by giving me an
"entertainment allowance" which I was forbidden to spend on anything
"worthwhile." My honours year project is about anthropic reasoning,
which I blog about a bit, and my opinions on political and social things
reflect what I write, though those things hardly count as practical
applications.
In other ways I think there's a disconnect. It can
be hard to apply abstract bits and pieces of understanding to messy
reality to find better courses of action than popular opinion could give
you. Also thinking about abstract things directly diverts attention
from things like remembering to eat breakfast, so reduces practical
competence that way. I'm at the end of undergraduate uni, so will soon
get to more important decisions that I nervously hope thinking will
influence to good effect.